Trends›Deglobalisation continues

Deglobalisation continues

Through 2030 trade, capital and technology blocs keep fragmenting and the post-1990 globalisation peak does not return, driving semiconductor decoupling, reshoring, critical-materials nationalism and divergent technical standards.

85 confidence, computed 23 Oct 2026

Political
High weight

Fig. 1The evidence leans for, about 6 to one by weight, and the newest evidence points the same way.

Rests onfacts underneath

Evidencethe schedule the figure draws

The evidence, newest first

Jul 2026
for · primary Nine bilateral Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs) signed in early-mid 2026 establish fragmented country-specific tariff regimes replacing the initially planned uniform reciprocal system. USTR Announces Reciprocal Trade Agreements with Nine Countries in 2026
Jun 2026
for · observable Trump-2 tariffs lifted the US average effective tariff rate to multi-decade highs — the core forcing function for trade-bloc fragmentation through 2026. Tariff tracker: 2026 Trump tariffs (Tax Foundation)
May 2026
for · primary As of May 2026, nine Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs) signed with trading partners construct legal architecture to pull US trade partners away from China and constrain China economically. US reciprocal trade deals are designed to constrain China to varying degrees
Apr 2026
for · primary State Council Order No. China's Export Controls: Critical Minerals and Strategic Pressure Points
Apr 2026
for · primary China continued to leverage its control of the rare earth supply chain in March 2026, including restricting exports to the United States and Japan. China's Global Exports of Rare Earth Elements and Rare Earth Permanent Magnets
Apr 2026
neutral · observable IMF notes private sector adapted to tariff changes in 2025; however, tariff-exposed GVC-intensive investment was disrupted, with tariff scenario modeling showing 0.3% global growth reduction, indicating partial trade fragmentation underway. World Economic Outlook April 2026: Global Economy in the Shadow of War
Apr 2026
for · primary As of April 2026, the US average effective tariff rate stands at 11.8% pre-substitution, the highest since the early 1940s. State of U.S. Tariffs: April 8, 2026 | The Budget Lab
Apr 2026
for · primary Since 2017, the average geopolitical distance of greenfield FDI has shrunk about 2x faster than trade, with tariff-exposed sectors (textiles, electronics, machinery) seeing project numbers fall 25% in 2025, reflecting fragmentation. Global Greenfield FDI in Strategic Sectors 2026
Mar 2026
neutral · primary World merchandise trade growth forecast to 1.9% in 2026 (down from 4.6% in 2025), with FDI in tariff-exposed sectors falling 25% in 2025, indicating fragmentation despite AI-driven resilience offsetting tariff headwinds. Global Trade Outlook and Statistics - March 2026
Mar 2026
against · observable Trump administration is downplaying export control issues publicly, approving export of higher-tier chips to China and suspending further restrictions amid trade negotiations (March 2026). US semiconductor export controls have cooled down
Feb 2026
for · primary China forced Trump to abandon structural demands that had been core to negotiations for five presidencies, resulting in narrower technical negotiations rather than re-integration (February 2026 outlook). The U.S.-China Trade War: What to Expect in 2026
Jan 2026
for · primary April 2025 restrictions on seven rare earth elements remain in place alongside dual-use licensing system continuing to constrain exports to US and allied military end-users through 2026. Rare Earth Supply Bottlenecks Set to Persist in 2026
Jan 2026
for · primary Taiwanese semiconductor enterprises will make new direct investments totaling at least $250 billion to build and expand advanced semiconductor, energy, and AI production capacity in the United States. US-Taiwan Semiconductor Trade & Investment Agreement Commits $250 Billion Direct Investment
Jan 2026
for · primary Construction for 18 new semiconductor factories (three 200mm, fifteen 300mm) is planned for 2025 with most projects scheduled to go into operation between 2026 and 2027. Semiconductor Industry Reshoring Accelerating: 18 New Fabs Planned for 2025-2027
Nov 2025
against · primary China suspended its Oct-2025 rare-earth measures and US-specific Ga/Ge/Sb/graphite licensing for ~one year (to Nov 2026) — a material de-escalation. China suspends certain critical-mineral controls for ~1 year (Pillsbury)
Oct 2025
against · observable World goods+services trade rose 7% to $34.65T in 2025; services hit a 27.6% share (highest since 2005); median trading partners per economy rose to 27 (from 17 in 2000) — resilience, not collapse. WTO: 2025 trade resilient, services at 20-year high
Oct 2025
for · observable WTO cut 2026 merchandise-trade growth to 0.5% (from 2.5% pre-tariff) citing US-China decoupling with bilateral tariffs 'well exceeding 100%' and trade diversion. WTO Global Trade Outlook Oct 2025 — 2026 cut to 0.5%
Oct 2025
neutral · observable WTO revised 2026 merchandise trade growth forecast downward to 0.5% from 2.5% April baseline, with tariff-adjusted vs. Global Trade Outlook and Statistics Update: October 2025
Aug 2025
neutral · observable 2025 merchandise trade revised up (to ~0.9% from -0.2%) on import frontloading — tariff effects delayed rather than absent; 2026 carries the downside. WTO: frontloading cushions 2025, 2026 risk high
Apr 2025
for · primary China's April 2025 controls on seven heavy rare earths and magnets (Dy, Tb, Y, Sc) weaponise critical materials — materials nationalism. China's new rare-earths export restrictions (CSIS)
Mar 2025
for · observable TSMC's $165B US commitment (Mar 2025) — the largest greenfield FDI in US history — is reshoring of leading-edge capacity into the Western bloc. TSMC expands US investment to $165B (TSMC)

What would move itthe measures watched

watchWTO/IMF world merchandise trade-volume growth vs pre-tariff baseline. Growth holding near baseline = resilience/re-integration; sharp gaps below = fragmentation biting
watchUS effective tariff rate and reciprocal-tariff implementation. Rising/sticky average tariffs = deglobalisation; rollbacks/exemptions = de-escalation
watchChina critical-minerals export-control status (rare earths, Ga, Ge, magnets). Active controls = materials nationalism; suspensions/general-licences = thaw
watchReshoring / greenfield FDI in strategic sectors. Large bloc-aligned FDI = reshoring; cancellations = subsidy fatigue
watchServices-trade share and median trading-partner count. Record services share + widening partner counts cut against a clean deglobalisation narrative